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Abstract 
This paper investigates the empirical significance of push- and pull factors of different types 
of capital flows – FDI, portfolio and “others” (including loans) – to emerging market and 
developing economies. Based on an extensive quarterly mixed time-series panel dataset for 
32 emerging market and developing economies from 2009 to 2017, we rigorously test down 
broadly specified empirical models for the three types of capital inflows to parsimonious 
final models in a Hendry-type fashion. Regarding push factors, our study focuses on the 
relative importance of global liquidity and economic policy uncertainty vis-à-vis country-
specific pull factors when assessing the drivers of capital flows to a broad set of emerging 
market and developing economies. Global liquidity, economic policy uncertainty and other 
risk factors, such as the US yield spread, turn out to be the most significant drivers of 
portfolio flows, but are also relevant to the other two categories of flows. Our capital flow-
type specific estimation results underscore the need for policymakers to analyse the 
composition of observed capital inflows to assess vulnerabilities related to external 
financing and safeguard financial stability. 
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Summary 
This study empirically analyses the push- and pull factors of capital flows to emerging 
market and developing economies. We built a comprehensive database of different types of 
capital flows, including foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio equity and debt, as well 
as “other investment”, comprising loans, amongst others. We also take account of 
institutional and other determinants of capital flows to emerging market and developing 
economies, such as exchange rate flexibility, capital account management, relative output 
growth, and various financial variables. As an innovation to this strand of literature, we 
analyse the role of economic policy uncertainty and global liquidity in driving capital flows 
within a mixed time-series panel approach. In doing so, the paper contributes to the 
assessment of financial stability in emerging market and developing economies after the 
global financial crisis of 2007/2008. 
Our panel estimation results confirm that a combination of pull- and push factors are 
significant drivers of capital flows. Global liquidity, economic policy uncertainty and other 
global risk factors, such as the US yield spread, turn out to be the most significant drivers 
of portfolio flows, but are also relevant to the other two categories of flows. The results also 
show that growth differentials vis-à-vis the US and foreign reserves are important pull 
factors for capital inflows to emerging market and developing economies.  
However, there is considerable variation in the results across the different variants of capital 
flows to developing and emerging market economies. For FDI inflows, macroeconomic 
stability (captured by high foreign exchange reserves), relatively stable exchange rates, capital 
account openness, and high income per capita appear as the most important variables, while 
higher global economic policy uncertainty clearly has an adverse effect. Variables capturing 
short-term financial conditions in both source and host countries turn out to be less relevant, 
which is in line with expectations given that FDI is generally longer-term in nature. 
With respect to pull factors, portfolio flows to developing and emerging market economies 
are affected by the growth differential vis-à-vis the US, trade openness, reserves, and 
exchange rate stability. The trade openness coefficient is significant and negative mainly 
because the trade-to-GDP ratio tends to be lower for larger economies. Moreover, the 
exchange rate coefficient is negative, suggesting that foreign portfolio investors are more 
inclined to invest when the exchange rate is more stable. Regarding push factors, the 
estimates for global liquidity are positive and highly significant throughout, indicating the 
importance of the ease of financing in global financial markets. Moreover, the coefficient 
estimates of the global economic policy uncertainty variable are negative and highly 
significant for portfolio flows. The US yield gap turns out to be negative in the case of 
portfolio flows (but positive for “other” investment, i.e. cross-border credit and loans). In 
the case of portfolio flows, we thus interpret the US yield gap as an indicator of global risk 
that negatively impacts capital inflows to emerging market and developing economies. 
Other capital flows, including cross-border lending, respond strongly to the growth 
differential vis-à-vis the US and “monetary” factors, such as foreign exchange reserves, and 
the US yield gap. Here, in the context of cross-border loans, the US yield gap enters with a 
positive sign and thus seems to serve as a global liquidity measure rather than a global risk 
measure.  
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When controlling for differences amongst country groups, the results we get when including 
only upper-middle-income and high-income economies, and the results from including only 
lower-middle income economies, are broadly in line with the results obtained with the full 
sample, confirming the overall robustness of the analysis. 
Our capital flow-type specific estimation results highlight the importance for policymakers 
in emerging market and developing economies of carefully analysing the composition of 
observed capital inflows and the factors that drive them. For any meaningful assessment of 
financial vulnerabilities related to external financing, it is crucial to understand the degree 
to which the drivers of capital flows are affected by domestic economic policies or 
international factors beyond the control of national economic policymaking. Examples of 
factors that are beyond the control of domestic economic policies include, according to our 
empirical results, the ease of financing in global financial markets (with credit being among 
the key indicators in major industrialised economies) as well as global policy uncertainty. 
As cyclical and structural forces have typically been analysed separately rather than in an 
integrated empirical framework in the previous literature, there is a risk that the importance 
of structural forces for capital flows to emerging market and developing economies may be 
understated in periods like the present one, when interest rates are ultra-low worldwide, 
global liquidity (“credit ease”) has gone down, and policy uncertainty is high. For this 
reason, an integrated empirical approach that simultaneously embraces structural push 
factors and external pull factors, such as policy uncertainty and global liquidity, as 
developed in this study, adds important insights for policy analysis. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper empirically analyses the push- and pull factors of capital flows to emerging market 
and developing economies. We built a comprehensive database of different types of capital 
flows, including foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio equity and debt, as well as other 
investment. We account for institutional and other determinants of capital flows to emerging 
market and developing economies, such as exchange rate flexibility, capital account 
management, relative output growth, and various financial variables. As an innovation to this 
strand of literature, we analyse the role of economic policy uncertainty and global liquidity 
(using the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) definition, which is more focused on the 
global ease of credit than on the sum of the expansion of broad monetary aggregates in leading 
industrialised economies), in driving capital flows within a mixed time-series panel approach. 
In doing so, the paper contributes to the assessment of financial stability in emerging market 
and developing economies after the global financial crisis of 2007/2008. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the literature on push- and 
pull factors of capital flows to emerging market and developing economies. Section 3 outlines 
our econometric approach and the data that we use. Section 4 explains our estimation 
procedure and presents our empirical findings and robustness checks. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Capital flows to emerging market and developing economies – push- 
and pull factors, global liquidity and policy uncertainty 
Capital flows to emerging market and developing countries: push- and pull factors 
The distinction between country-specific “pull” factors and external “push” factors of capital 
inflows was introduced by the seminal papers of Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993) and 
Fernández-Arias (1996). The latter provided what has been the basic analytical framework 
for the empirical analysis of the drivers of capital inflows to emerging market and developing 
countries since the mid-1990s. The pre-2007/2008 crisis era was characterised by an – in some 
cases sharp – increase in capital flows to emerging market and developing economies due to 
increasing financial integration and strong growth prospects in these economies (Hannan, 
2017). The sharp decline in foreign capital flows to emerging market and developing 
economies during the global financial crisis has been predominantly interpreted in the 
literature as the effect of a powerful “push shock” in global risk aversion that gave an incentive 
to global investors to unwind their positions in emerging market and developing economies 
(Fratzscher, 2012; Lo Duca, 2012; Milesi-Ferretti & Tille, 2011). 
Since the crisis, markets have thematised another external factor, namely the impact of ultra-
expansionary monetary policies in industrialised economies via global liquidity spillovers on 
emerging market and developing economies’ capital flows – the very topic that was at the 
core of Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993) and has also been analysed by Fratzscher, Lo 
Duca and Straub (2013). Since 2009, capital flows to emerging market and developing 
economies have been characterised by high volatility (Ahmed & Zlate, 2014; IMF, 2016b; 
see also Appendices 2-7). While FDI still dominates total flows, portfolio and other 
investment flows have also increased over time, giving policy makers new challenges of how 
to deal with the higher volatility associated with such flows (Pagliari & Hannan, 2017). 
Against this backdrop, we analyse all three categories of flows in this paper. However, given 
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that the volatility of capital flows to emerging market and developing economies is generally 
perceived to reflect the fact that emerging market and developing economies represent a 
riskier asset class (Bluedorn et al., 2013), we pay particular attention to global factors affecting 
these flows. 
Koepke (2015) summarises the main pattern of the growing empirical literature regarding 
the drivers of capital flows to emerging market and developing economies. The drivers of 
capital flows seem to vary over time and across different categories of capital flows. He 
classifies the drivers referring to the traditional “push vs. pull” framework and makes a 
distinction between cyclical and structural factors. According to his analysis, push factors 
are found to matter most for portfolio flows, as corroborated by our study. Pull factors, as 
in our case, matter for all three components. Finally, his historical review suggests that the 
recent literature may have overemphasised the importance of cyclical (push) factors at the 
expense of longer-term structural (pull) factors. However, this is a statement we would like 
to check explicitly with our broad dataset. As a prior, it cannot be excluded that cyclical 
impacts of global push factors will have a permanent effect (hysteresis) on capital flows. 
Bruno and Shin (2013) investigate global factors such as global liquidity associated with 
cross-border capital flows. For this purpose, they specify a model of gross capital flows 
through the international banking system and highlight the leverage cycle of global banks 
as being a significant driver of the transmission of financial conditions across borders. They 
then test their model for a panel of 46 countries, comprising also a couple of emerging 
market and developing economies, and find that global factors dominate local factors as 
determinants of banking sector capital flows. 
In this context, Foerster, Jorra and Tillmann (2014) examine the degree of co-movement of 
gross capital inflows as a sensitive issue for policy makers. In that respect, they have a 
different focus than our paper. They estimate a dynamic hierarchical factor model that 
decomposes capital inflows in a sample of 47 economies into a global factor common to all 
types of flows and all destination countries, a factor specific to a given type of capital inflows, 
a regional factor, and a country-specific component. According to their study, the latter (i.e., 
the pull factors) explains by far the largest fraction of fluctuations in capital inflows, followed 
by regional factors, which are especially important for emerging markets’ FDI, and portfolio 
inflows, as well as bank lending to Emerging Europe. But their global factor explains only a 
small share of the overall variation, a result which slightly differs from ours. Their study 
shows, as does ours, that the global factor mirrors United States (US) “financial” conditions. 
Capital inflows to Latin America in the 1990s are said to be influenced by factors originating 
outside the region, contributing to a higher macroeconomic vulnerability of the region’s 
economies (Calvo et al., 1993; Calvo & Reinhart, 1996; more generally, see Ahmed, Coulibaly, 
& Zlate, 2015). Lim (2014), who investigates the effect of quantitative easing (QE) on financial 
flows to emerging market and developing economies, finds evidence for potential transmission 
of QE to capital flows along observable liquidity, portfolio balancing, and confidence channels. 
Transmission channels of global liquidity spillovers to emerging market and developing 
economies 
In general, an accommodative monetary policy stance by major central banks mainly includes 
large-scale asset purchases, long-term refinancing operations, low or negative nominal 
interest rates, and communication efforts in the shape of forward guidance. Such non-standard 
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German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 5 
monetary policies may affect financial asset prices as well as demand-supply conditions in 
goods and services markets within emerging market and developing economies through three 
interrelated transmission channels.1 
The first transmission channel is the portfolio-balance channel through which especially 
large-scale asset purchases may affect financial asset prices, meaning that central banks 
perturb the portfolios of financial investors by purchasing financial assets from the private 
sector. Presuming imperfect substitutability of financial assets, a local-supply effect may 
occur when a central bank purchases specific financial asset classes, thereby restricting the 
specific relative supply; further, large-scale asset purchases may have a duration effect 
concerning the effect on the term structure of portfolios as a whole (D’Amico & King, 2013). 
For example, when central banks purchase large amounts of government debt with long-term 
maturities, the adjusted financial investor portfolios may become less exposed to interest rate 
risks. As a consequence, financial investors may, first, alter the composition of their portfolio 
to match (e.g., their preferred maturity structure) and, second, financial investors may re-
assess the expected risk-adjusted returns on investment of the entire portfolio. In this respect, 
a relatively low-risk-profit profile of portfolios prompted by central banks’ large-scale asset 
purchases within major-currency economies gives rise to a change in the interest rate 
differential vis-à-vis developing and emerging market economies. As a result, financial 
investors may be directed towards the latter economies, meaning that global liquidity 
spillovers can be attributed to the portfolio-balance channel. 
A second transmission channel is the signalling channel. Here, central banks seek to manage 
expectations of economic agents, in particular, of financial investors, concerning economic 
key variables and the future course of monetary policy via communication. Respective 
statements may help steer financial investors in a way that changes liquidity premiums within 
the financial sector. As a consequence, portfolio-rebalancing may take place involving the 
economic adjustments discussed in the preceding paragraphs. 
Third, central banks may directly affect liquidity within the financial sector via the liquidity 
channel that primarily operates in times of financial distress. In such occasions, financial 
investors may require relatively high returns on holding financial assets as compensation for 
the risk that one may have difficulties in engaging in bilateral contracts, which eventually 
allow such economic agents to dispose of the real goods and services to which one attributes 
value. In addition, liquidity risks may arise in the form of coordination costs pertaining to the 
search and matching processes involved in scheduling and carrying out bilateral contracts. In 
this respect, central banks may attempt to bring down liquidity risk premiums by providing, 
for instance, long-term refinancing operations as well as low or negative nominal interest 
rates, such that the overall volume in trading increases. Changes in the liquidity premium may 
in turn prompt the afore-mentioned duration- and local-supply-effects resulting in 
readjustments of financial investor portfolios. 
Regarding empirical evidence, Bauer and Neely (2014), for example, estimate dynamic 
term structure models to reveal to what extent the signalling and the portfolio balance 
channel contribute to global liquidity spillovers in terms of affecting bond yields in 
emerging market and developing economies (see also Belke, Dubova, & Volz, 2017). 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Neely (2015) and Belke, Gros and Osowski (2017) for an extensive presentation and 
explanation of these channels. 
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Bowman, Londono and Sapriza (2015) evaluate the effects on other financial asset prices in 
a similar way and stress the importance of country-specific idiosyncrasies within small open 
emerging market and developing economies. Interestingly, McCauley, McGuire and 
Sushko (2015) provide empirical evidence that non-standard monetary policies within the 
US have shifted the international transmission of US monetary policy from internationally 
active commercial banks extending credit denominated in US-dollar to purchases of higher 
yielding financial assets denominated in US-dollar by non-US issuers. Finally, Burger, 
Warnock and Cacdac Warnock (2017) show that emerging market and developing countries 
issued more sovereign and private-sector local currency bonds and more private-sector 
foreign currency bonds when US long-term interest rates were low. 
Furthermore, cross-border financial flows to emerging market and developing economies 
stemming from financial investor portfolio rebalancing and tracing back to a lax monetary 
policy stance within major-currency economies may also bear on exchange rate and trade 
relations (Lavigne, Sarker, & Vasishtha, 2014). Accordingly, global liquidity spillovers may 
prompt nominal revaluations within recipient economies. However, the possibly increasing 
external demand within major-currency economies for production manufactured within 
emerging market and developing economies may offset the incipient revaluation. Obviously, 
assessing the magnitude of the overall effect of global liquidity spillovers on economic 
dynamics within developing and emerging market economies is an empirical matter. The sign 
and the size of the effects of global liquidity spillovers tracing back to non-standard monetary 
policies within major-currency economies involves taking account of the propagation of such 
financial shocks within small open emerging market and developing economies.2 
On the sign of uncertainty impacts on macroeconomic variables 
As far as the effect of uncertainty on the real and the financial sector is concerned, the 
transmission channels of uncertainty and the magnitude and sign of the uncertainty impacts 
are of interest (Belke & Goecke, 2005; Bloom, 2013). In this study, we also deal with 
investment-type decisions under (policy) uncertainty, namely capital flows to emerging 
market and developing economies. We have models in mind that were originally proposed 
by Dixit (1989) and Pindyck (1991) and serve as the basis to develop an option value of 
waiting with investment-type decisions under uncertainty. In this context, investment-type 
decisions involve fixed sunk (i.e., irreversible) hiring and firing costs (Caballero, 1991; 
Darby et al., 1999). The main implication of these kind of models is that the sign of the 
uncertainty effect on investment-type decisions tends to be ambiguous. In the case of 
general investment, the sign of the estimated uncertainty coefficient may be positive since 
it is beneficial for an investor to be capable of reacting properly to different states of the 
economy in the future (Bloom, 2013; Caballero, 1991). In the case of specific “investment”, 
however, the generally expected sign of the uncertainty coefficient is negative. This mirrors 
the “option value of waiting under uncertainty” (Leduc & Zheng, 2016). This option is 
valuable because it enables the investor to cut off the negative part of the distribution of 
returns from this investment. These real options effects act to make firms more cautious 
about hiring and investing (in a foreign country), thus leading to lower growth there 
(Caggiano, Castelnuovo, & Pellegrino, 2017). 
                                                 
2 For a more comprehensive presentation and explanation of the impact of global liquidity on capital inflows 
to emerging market and developing economies see Belke (2017). 
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An alternative scenario is that uncertainty does not affect a specific variable directly but has 
an impact on the relationship between the variables of interest. This is because uncertainty 
enlarges a “band of inaction”, which can be traced back to hiring and firing costs, due to the 
option value effects described above (Belke & Goecke, 2005). This is valid even under risk 
neutrality of the investor. Consequently, the sign of the estimated uncertainty coefficient on 
the investment-type variable is ambiguous. In other words, more uncertainty hampers 
investment and de-investment.3 
In this context it is important to note that models relying on risk aversion usually imply 
negative uncertainty effects. In this case, risk-premia emerge, which enhance the cost of 
finance (Bloom, 2013) and, through this mechanism, dampen asset prices as well. Economic 
policy uncertainty is shown to have a negative impact on future stock market returns at various 
horizons, which in turn may negatively affect portfolio investments in emerging market and 
developing economies (Chen, Jiang, & Tong, 2016). For instance, it can be shown that 
monetary policy uncertainty causes a risk premium in the US Treasury bond market (Jiang & 
Tong, 2016). This insight may well extend to emerging market and developing countries. 
As a stylised fact gained from empirical studies, uncertainty has a negative impact on 
growth (Ramey & Ramey, 1995; Engle & Rangel, 2008) and credit (Bordo et al., 2016) and, 
as a consequence, also on (foreign) investment and output (Aastveit, Natvik, & Sola, 2013; 
Bloom, 2009; Bloom et al., 2013).4, According to several empirical studies, the effect of 
uncertainty on monetary policy (which in one or the other specification plays a larger role 
in the literature about push factors of capital flows) is best matched by the notion of a “wait-
and-see” monetary policy (Lei & Tseng, 2016). Under uncertainty, the impact of monetary 
policy is thus lower (Aastveit, Natvik, & Sola, 2013) and sometimes some non-linearity 
becomes relevant (Pellegrino, 2018). Furthermore, it is possible that the uncertainty effect 
on investment-type variables such as FDI interacts with the monetary policy stance. If the 
economy is, as in the sample period considered here, close to the zero lower bound, the 
uncertainty effect is supposed to be even larger (Caggiano, Castelnuovo, & Pellegrino, 
2017).5 This has not been investigated more deeply for capital flows to emerging market 
and developing economies and again underlines the importance and timeliness of our study. 
Finally, policy uncertainty tends to let the domestic currency depreciate and to trigger 
exchange rate volatility.6 This may well be especially valid for emerging market and 
developing economies (Jongwanich & Kohpaiboon, 2013). More specifically, in our 
context, a less forecastable global political environment has the potential to lower the 
prospects of global growth, thus diminishing the attractiveness of investing in a specific 
country (Baker et al., 2013; Gauvin, McLoughlin, & Reinhardt, 2014; Fernández-Villaverde 
et al., 2011). At the same time, an increase in global policy uncertainty will tend to lower 
the overall size of investors’ positions in relatively more risky countries, and advanced-
economy investors’ preparedness to take risk. This in turn may lead to safe haven flows out 
                                                 
3 Aastveit, Natvik and Sola (2013) estimate that investment reacts two to five times weaker when 
uncertainty is in its upper instead of its lower decile. 
4 For a comprehensive survey, see IMF (2016a). For a survey, see Bloom (2013). 
5 See Caggiano, Castelnuovo and Pellegrino (2017) and Basu and Bundick (2017). 
6 See http://www.euroexchangeratenews.co.uk/eur-usd-exchange-rate-skyrockets-us-political-uncertainty-
weighs-us-dollar-21586. 
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of emerging market and developing economies that are often considered less safe (Gauvin, 
McLoughlin & Reinhardt, 2014). 
All these considerations are applicable to the relationship between (policy/political) 
uncertainty and foreign direct (and also other categories of) investment into emerging 
market and developing economies.7 Hence, we believe it is important to include policy 
uncertainty in our empirical model to check for the push- and pull factors of capital flows 
to emerging market and developing economies, especially FDI due to its higher degree of 
irreversibilities (sunk costs) than pure portfolio investments. 
3 Data and empirical model 
We compile a comprehensive database on different types of capital flows to emerging 
market and developing economies, including FDI, portfolio capital flows as well as other 
investment, sourced from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Financial Flow 
Analytics Database. The three types of flows are: (1) FDI, “a category of cross-border 
investments associated with a resident in one economy having control or a significant degree 
of influence on the management of an enterprise that is resident in another economy”; (2) 
portfolio flows, “defined as cross-border transactions and positions involving debt or equity 
securities, other than those included in direct investment or reserve assets”; and (3) other 
investment flows, “a residual category that includes positions and transactions other than 
those included in direct investment, portfolio investment, financial derivatives and 
employee stock options, and reserve assets”, classified in government-related flows and 
private flows (bank and non-bank flows).8 Other investment flows comprises other equity, 
currency and deposits, loans, insurance, pension, and standardised guarantees schemes, 
trade credits and advances, other accounts receivable/payable and special drawing rights. 
Loans comprise assets/liabilities created through the direct lending of funds by the creditor 
to the debtor. These include financial leases, repurchase agreements, borrowing from the 
IMF and loans to finance trade and all other loans (including mortgages) (IMF, 2015). 
In accordance with the literature (IMF, 2016b; Koepke, 2015), we group the drivers of 
capital flows into “push” and “pull” factors. We start with a general empirical panel model 
(see, for instance, Clark et al., 2016) to assess the empirical significance of a variety of 
determinants of capital flows: 
 
where ??,t stands for the ratio of capital flows – either FDI (DIRIN), portfolio flows (PORTIN), 
or other investment flows (OTHERINV) – to country i during time period t, modelled as a 
fraction of the country’s nominal gross domestic product (GDP). As our final empirical 
models, we selected those that employ gross inflows (i.e., the change in domestic resident 
liabilities (LIAB) to foreigners) as the dependent variable. However, we also experimented 
with net inflows, defined as gross inflows (change in domestic resident liabilities to 
foreigners) minus gross outflows (change in foreign assets (ASSET) owned by domestic 
                                                 
7 See, for instance, Chen and Funke (2003) and Chen et al. (2016). 
8 For these definitions, see IMF (2013). 
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residents).9 However, the latter specifications in the end turned out to be inferior according to 
the usual goodness-of-fit criteria. 
Thus, our dependent variables are: 
• DIRINVLIAB?, PORTINVLIAB?, OTHERINVLIAB? 
• DIRINVASSET?, PORTINVASSET?, OTHERINVASSET? 
We model both net capital flows and gross capital inflows as a share of GDP as a function of 
fixed effects (?? =1, if an observation belongs to country i, 0 otherwise); a vector of variables 
representing external conditions or push factors; and a vector of variables representing domestic 
conditions or pull factors.10 Net inflows and gross inflows are both employed as separate 
dependent variables for both total and private flows and we work with a variety of types of 
investment flows, among them FDI, portfolio investment and other investment flows.11 
Our independent variables include the push- and pull factors generally considered in the 
literature plus policy/political uncertainty and global liquidity. 
Pull factors include mainly domestic structural variables – trade openness (TRADEOPEN) 
measured as total trade as share of GDP; foreign exchange reserves as share of GDP 
(RESERVES); exchange rate regime (EXR); institutional quality (INSTQUAL); income 
per capita (INCOMECAPI); capital account openness (CAPACCOPEN); and financial 
development (FD) –, but also drivers implemented as differentials vis-à-vis the US, namely 
interest rate (CENTRALBANKRATE) and growth differentials (Ahmed & Zlate, 2014; 
Herrmann & Mihaljek, 2013).12,13 Checking for the impact of the growth differential vis-à-
vis the US (DGDP?) – that is, real GDP growth of the country in question minus real GDP 
growth in the US – allows us to test the prediction of the textbook neoclassical growth model 
that countries with faster growth should invest more and attract more foreign capital, that 
is, the notion that international capital is flowing “uphill”. Empirical analysis by Gourinchas 
and Jeanne (2013) suggests that the allocation of capital flows across emerging market and 
developing countries turns out to be the opposite of this prediction: capital does not flow 
more to emerging market and developing economies that invest and grow more. They call 
this the “allocation puzzle”. 
According to available meta-studies, pull factors should, as our prior, matter for all three 
components (FDI, portfolio and other), but matter most for banking flows, which are 
included in other flows (Foerster, Jorra, & Tillmann, 2014; Koepke, 2015). 
                                                 
9 This is consistent with the IMF’s Financial Flows Analytics (FFA) database. 
10 We employ fixed effects redundancy F-tests to check whether a fixed or a random effects model should be 
applied in the context of this study. The test results point at the adequacy of the fixed effects specification. 
11 In line with Forbes and Warnock (2012), we model both gross inflows and net inflows (inflows minus 
outflows). However, in the end, we come up with final estimations based on gross inflows which have a 
much better empirical fit. 
12 See, for instance, Shah and Ahmed (2003) for country-specific pull factors such as magnitude of the domestic 
market and the quality of institutions, for FDI flows to Pakistan. See Ahlquist (2006) for institutional quality 
and political decision-making in the recipient countries for emerging market and developing economies. 
13 As robustness checks, we alternatively use growth and interest rate differentials vis-à-vis another advanced 
economy, the euro area. However, the results, which are available on request, do not differ much. 
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The list of pull factors (with the expected sign of the estimated coefficient in brackets) looks 
as follows: 
• DGDP? + 
• CENTRALBANKRATE? +14 
• TRADEOPEN? +/-15 
• RESERVES? + 
• EXR? +/- 
• INSTQUAL? + 
• INCOMECAPI? + 
• CAPACCOPEN? + 
• FD? + 
Among the push factors, the most commonly identified are indicators of global risk appetite 
and US monetary policy. In our analysis, we focus in particular on global liquidity and global 
uncertainty as global factors. The variables we include as push factors comprise global 
economic policy uncertainty (EPU), global risk aversion (VIX), development of commodity 
prices (COMMODITYPRICE), and – in accordance with IMF (2016b) – the US corporate 
spread (USCORPSPREAD), the US yield gap (USYIELDGAP), and global liquidity. For the 
latter, we use two measures: (i) the BIS global liquidity indicator (GLIBIS), defined as cross-
border lending and local lending denominated in foreign currencies for all instruments and 
for all sectors (BIS, 2017), and (ii) total Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) broad money (GLIOECD). As an auxiliary measure of global 
liquidity, we also experimented with the US monetary policy stance as measured by the 
shadow federal funds rate (SHADOWFEDERALFUNDSRATE).16 
For the uncertainty variable we use the economic policy uncertainty index developed by 
Baker, Bloom and Davis (2015). The economic policy uncertainty variable measures policy-
related economic uncertainty and has three underlying components. One component 
quantifies newspaper coverage of policy-related economic uncertainty by searching for 
certain keywords in the media. Since this index is only available for very few of the 
developing and emerging market economies in our sample, we use the global policy 
uncertainty index in our study.  
With an eye on the “option value of waiting under uncertainty” approach, we expect a higher 
impact of policy uncertainty on FDI, due to its higher irreversibilities, than on portfolio 
flows or other flows. Our prior is that push factors may matter most for portfolio flows, 
somewhat less for banking flows, and least for FDI (see, for instance, Koepke, 2015). 
                                                 
14 We also experimented with the difference between an emerging market economy’s policy rate and the US 
policy rate. Expressed equivalently, we can list the US policy rate as a pull factor further below. 
15 One would expect that an economy that is more open to trade, and thereby integrated into the global 
economy, would receive more capital inflows. However, the trade-to-GDP ratio tends to be lower for larger 
economies. Hence, according to our prior, the expected sign of the trade openness variable in our capital 
inflow regressions is +/-. 
16 In an environment in which the policy interest rates are constrained downwards by the zero lower bound and 
major central banks have implemented unconventional measures, the US policy rate no longer represents a 
complete and coherent measure of monetary policy. Hence, as in Belke, Dubova and Volz (2017), we 
substituted the US policy interest rate with the US shadow rate (Krippner, 2015; Wu & Xia, 2016). 
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The higher the US corporate spread (i.e., US BAA corporate bond spreads over treasury), 
the greater is the yield on equity compared with government bonds, and equity is under-
priced. A positive corporate spread indicates more opportunities to buy in the equity 
markets. Thus, a widening gap between equity and bond yields indicates a new growth cycle 
and more business optimism around the world. 
The US yield gap, defined as the gap between longer-dated and shorter-dated US Treasury 
yields, usually shrinks if, for instance, surprisingly strong data on retail sales support the 
view the Federal Reserve would raise interest rates further to keep the economy from 
overheating. If, on the contrary, the gap is still large, no interest rate increases loom at the 
short- to medium run horizon and business sentiments are very positive. This leaves open 
two interpretations for our empirical analysis. 
The first interpretation would run as follows. If a shrinking yield gap suggests a weaker 
growth outlook in the US, we would expect a lower yield gap to be a push factor for capital 
flows into developing and emerging economies, whose relative growth performance will look 
better compared with the US (corresponding with a negative sign of the yield gap variable in 
our capital inflow regressions). However, an alternative exegesis would be that a weaker 
growth outlook for the US would be seen by investors as a signal of a cooling down of the 
world economy, that is, a global risk factor. In that case a lower US yield gap would lead to 
less capital inflow to emerging market and developing economies (implying a positive sign 
of the yield gap coefficient). Hence, we do not have a prior about the sign of the US yield gap 
in our capital inflow regression equations and we leave it to our empirical estimations. 
This is all the more valid with an eye on the fact that a shrinking yield gap could also be 
caused by the efforts of the US Federal Reserve to lower long-term rates given zero short-
term rates, that is, to smooth the yield curve by its unconventional monetary policy measures 
over the sample period considered here (Belke, Gros, & Osowski, 2017). According to this 
view, the US yield gap would represent a (reverse) indicator of global liquidity instead of a 
global risk measure. 
The list of push factors (with our prior regarding the expected sign of the estimated 
coefficient in brackets) therefore looks as follows: 
• D(EPU) - 
• VIX - 
• COMMODITYPRICE - 
• GLIBIS + 
• GLIOECD + 
• USYIELDGAP +/- 
• D(SHADOWFEDERALFUNDSRATE) - 
• CENTRALBANKRATE_US – 
Research focused on extreme capital flow episodes – sudden stops and surges – seems to 
conclude that push factors determine whether inflow surges occur and affect the riskiness 
of flows, while pull factors affect the direction and magnitude of such surges (Ghosh et al., 
2014). Other research indicates that some types of flows tend to be more sensitive with 
respect to changes in push- and pull factors during such episodes (Calvo, 1998; Forbes & 
Warnock, 2012; Hannan, 2017). 
Ansgar Belke / Ulrich Volz 
12 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
Hence, in a much longer-term oriented analysis of capital flows covering several decades 
of data, it may be necessary to separate periods of extreme capital flows from those which 
appear “normal”. However, this is not the case in our analysis, which we intentionally limit 
to the period after the financial crisis. The six variants of capital flow series we investigate do 
not display systematic structural breaks reflecting periods of extreme capital flows (see 
Appendices 2 to 7).17 Moreover, our unit roots tests conducted in Section 4.1 show that our 
time-series are clearly stationary, indicating the absence of periods of extreme capital flows. 
Furthermore, push- and pull factors may be interrelated. In this context, for instance, Fernández-
Arias (1996) empirically assessed the boost to emerging market and developing economies 
borrowers’ creditworthiness initiated by a decline in US interest rates. These interrelations may 
lead to multicollinearity in our estimated empirical models and in some cases to the appearance 
of one or the other factor (pull or push) in the final regression specifications. We leave this task 
of variable selection to our empirical analysis in the following sections. 
The specification of the variables and the related data sources used are listed in the necessary 
detail in Appendix 1. Taking logarithms was not possible in some cases due to negative 
empirical realisations of some variables in our sample. This, in turn, results in a quite huge 
dimension of estimated regression coefficients. However, not taking logs does not matter 
much for the qualitative and quantitative interpretation of our results. However, it prevents 
us from interpreting the estimated coefficients as elasticities. 
We perform our regression analysis employing a panel framework comprising 32 emerging 
market and developing economies (Albania, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Croatia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, FYR Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine and Uruguay).18 
We follow the IMF’s definition of emerging market and developing economies used in its 
annual World Economic Outlook (WEO) and include as many economies as data availability 
allows.19 Our estimation period is based on quarterly data and ranges from the 1st quarter of 
2009 to the 3rd quarter of 2017 in order to exclude movements in capital flows that are 
extraordinary and exceptional.20 Our sample period is in a few cases limited upwards, for 
                                                 
17 Hence, we do not see the need to check for significant sample splits in an additional robustness check section. 
18 In very few cases, a country, such as Ecuador, Malaysia, or Paraguay drops out if no observations of a 
certain variable are available. These cases are indicated explicitly in the results tables. 
19 The IMF (2018, p. 218) describes its approach as follows: “The country classification in the WEO divides the 
world into two major groups: advanced economies and emerging market and developing economies. This 
classification is not based on strict criteria, economic or otherwise, and it has evolved over time. The objective 
is to facilitate analysis by providing a reasonably meaningful method of organizing data.” Some of the countries 
that fall under the IMF’s classification of emerging market and developing economies are classified by the 
World Bank as high-income economies (as of July 2018). In our sample, these are Chile, Croatia, Hungary, 
Poland, Saudi Arabia and Uruguay. Seven countries in our sample – Egypt, El Salvador, India, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Sri Lanka and Ukraine – are classified by the World Bank as lower-middle income economies. 
The remaining economies are classified by the World Bank as upper-middle income economies. 
20 We have chosen 2009 as the starting year of our estimation period to start with the quarter by which flows 
had recovered from the crisis (Hannan, 2017; Ahmed & Zlate, 2014) and to capture post-crisis capital 
flow determinants in our study. The third quarter of 2009 corresponds with the first quarter after the US 
business cycle trough according to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) (see 
http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). As the initial quarter of our sample period we have thus chosen the first 
Capital flows to emerging market and developing economies 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 13 
instance due to the limited availability of the Chinn-Ito index measuring capital account 
openness or the Svirydzenka index of financial development (for details, see Appendix 1, 
which displays all time-series considered, i.e., also those which are not available over the 
complete sample period). A graphical depiction of all variables can be found in the Appendix. 
4 Empirical results 
As a first step, we conduct panel unit root tests according to Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), 
Breitung (2000), Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), and Fisher-type tests using augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests (Choi, 2001; Maddala & Wu, 1999). 
Hence, in order to be able to estimate a stationary panel, we took first differences of the 
variables that were I(1) and the first differences turned out to be stationary. 
As a second step, we apply pooled least squares and panel estimated generalised least 
squares (EGLS) with cross-section weights estimations of a mixed time-series/cross-section 
model based on stationary time-series with White cross-section standard errors (to allow for 
general contemporaneous correlation between the branch-specific residuals) and White 
covariance (MacKinnon & White, 1985; White, 1980). Non-zero covariances are allowed 
across cross-sections (degree-of-freedom corrected). The estimator we employ in this study 
is thus robust to cross-equation (contemporaneous) correlation and heteroskedasticity. 
Beforehand, we tested for the joint significance of the fixed effects estimates. For this 
purpose, we test the hypothesis that the estimated fixed effects are jointly significant using 
an F- and an LR-test. This estimation procedure is highly recommended in a scenario like 
ours where the time dimension is rather short. For instance, we could not apply an Arellano-
Bond dynamic panel estimation procedure in our context (Arellano & Bond, 1991), 
although it would be interesting to assess the impact of push- and pull factors for capital 
flows to individual emerging market and developing economies separately, for instance 
through country-specific slope coefficients. By this, we could test the homogeneity 
assumption regarding the impact of the push- and pull factors on capital flows to the group 
of the emerging market and developing economies that we investigate. 
In the following, we display the results of our econometric analysis of financial and capital 
flows to emerging and developing countries and the role of domestic and international factors 
(push- and pull factors), especially global liquidity and global uncertainty and risk factors. 
4.1 Tests for stationarity 
We conduct unit root tests of the dependent, pull- and push factor variables to be employed 
in our empirical mixed time-series panel models of capital inflows to emerging market and 
developing economies. The results of our single time-series unit root tests (for global push 
factors) are displayed in Table 1, and those of our panel unit root tests (country-specific 
dependent variables and pull factors) are conveyed in Table 2. In most cases, the results of 
our unit root tests indicate that our variables do not have to be differenced in order to be 
                                                 
quarter of 2009 in order to allow for a few lags in our regression equation specifications without 
unnecessarily losing additional degrees of freedom.  
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stationary. What is more, many of the pull factors we selected are “institutional” variables 
and must therefore be treated as “breaks in the constant” of the regression, that is, variables 
that are stationary by definition (Belke, 2000). 
Table 1: Single time-series unit root tests (test statistics and probabilities) 
EPU – Levels 
Null hypothesis: EPU has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag length: 0 (automatic – based on Akaike information 
criterion (AIC), maxlag=8) 
   t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.240534 0.1964 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.639407  
 5% level  -2.951125  
 10% level  -2.614300  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
EPU – First differences 
Null hypothesis: D(EPU) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag length: 0 (automatic – based on AIC, maxlag=8) 
   t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -5.893712 0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.646342  
 5% level  -2.954021  
 10% level  -2.615817  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
VIX – Levels  
Null hypothesis: VIX has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag length: 0 (automatic – based on AIC, maxlag=4) 
   t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.302869 0.1810 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.831511  
 5% level  -3.029970  
 10% level  -2.655194  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
 
COMMODITYPRICE – Levels 
Null hypothesis: COMMODITYPRICE has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, linear trend  
Lag length: 8 (automatic – based on AIC, maxlag=8) 
   t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.672809 0.7331 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.374307  
 5% level  -3.603202  
 10% level  -3.238054  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
GLIBIS – Levels 
Null hypothesis: GLIBIS has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag length: 0 (automatic – based on AIC, maxlag=8) 
   t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.390261 0.1521 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.646342  
 5% level  -2.954021  
 10% level  -2.615817  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
GLIOECD – Levels 
Null hypothesis: GLIOECD has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag length: 0 (automatic - based on AIC, maxlag=8) 
   t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  5.300690 1.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.639407  
 5% level  -2.951125  
 10% level  -2.614300  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
USCORPSPREAD – Levels 
Null hypothesis: USCORPSPREAD has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag length: 0 (automatic – based on AIC, maxlag=4) 
   t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.345155 0.5863 
USCORPSPREAD – First differences 
Null hypothesis: D(USCORPSPREAD) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag length: 0 (automatic – based on AIC, maxlag=4) 
   t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.503517 0.0204 
Capital flows to emerging market and developing economies 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 15 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.831511  
 5% level  -3.029970  
 10% level  -2.655194  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.857386  
 5% level  -3.040391  
 10% level  -2.660551  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
USYIELDGAP – Levels 
Null hypothesis: USYIELDGAP has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag length: 1 (automatic – based on AIC, maxlag=8) 
   t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.665578 0.0095 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.646342  
 5% level  -2.954021  
 10% level  -2.615817  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
CENTRALBANKRATE_US – Levels 
Null hypothesis: CENTRALBANKRATE_US has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag length: 0 (automatic – based on AIC, maxlag=8) 
   t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic 5.631250 1.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.639407  
 5% level  -2.951125  
 10% level  -2.614300  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
DGDP_US – Levels 
Null hypothesis: DGDP_US has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag length: 4 (automatic – based on AIC, maxlag=8) 
   t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.694013  0.0868 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.670170  
 5% level  -2.963972  
 10% level  -2.621007  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
 
SHADOWFEDERALFUNDSRATE – Levels 
Null hypothesis: SHADOWFEDERALFUNDSRATE has a unit 
root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag length: 1 (automatic – based on AIC, maxlag=6) 
   t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.584618 0.4759 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.711457  
 5% level  -2.981038  
 10% level  -2.629906  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
SHADOWFEDERALFUNDSRATE – First differences 
Null hypothesis: D(SHADOWFEDERALFUNDSRATE) has a
unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, linear trend  
Lag length: 0 (automatic – based on AIC, maxlag=6) 
   t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.848836 0.6515 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.356068  
 5% level  -3.595026  
 10% level  -3.233456  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
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Table 2: Panel unit root tests (test statistics and probabilities) 
1. Dependent variable  
DIRINVASSET? – Levels 
 
Sample: 2009Q1 2017Q3   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags 
Automatic lag length selection based on Schwarz information 
criterion (SIC): 0 to 6 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -20.6215 0.0000 31 996
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -20.7769 0.0000 31 996
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 506.073 0.0000 31 996
PP - Fisher Chi-square 542.772 0.0000 31 1009
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an 
asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume 
asymptotic normality. 
31 cross-sections, because time-series for Ecuador is not available. 
 
DIRINVLIAB? – Levels 
 
Sample: 2009Q1 2017Q3   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags 
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 6 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -43.5645 0.0000 32 1008
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -22.7550 0.0000 32 1008
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 437.784 0.0000 32 1008
PP - Fisher Chi-square 479.563 0.0000 32 1042
22 7550 0 0000 32 1008
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an 
asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume 
asymptotic normality. 
 
 
PORTINVASSET? – Levels 
 
Sample: 2009Q1 2017Q3   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags 
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 6 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -21.4338 0.0000 31 999 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -22.3170 0.0000 31 999 
ADF – Fisher Chi-square 525.049 0.0000 31 999 
PP – Fisher Chi-square 562.570 0.0000 31 1002
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an 
asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume 
asymptotic normality. 
31 cross-sections, because time-series for Paraguay is not available. 
PORTINVLIAB? – Levels 
 
Sample: 2009Q1 2017Q3   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags 
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 7 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -17.7539 0.0000 31 990
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -17.7656 0.0000 31 990
ADF – Fisher Chi-square 423.364 0.0000 31 990
PP – Fisher Chi-square 553.377 0.0000 31 1009
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an 
asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume 
asymptotic normality. 
31 cross-sections, because time-series for Paraguay is not available 
OTHERINVASSET? – Levels 
 
Sample: 2009Q1 2017Q3   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags 
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 5 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
OTHERINVLIAB? – Levels 
 
Sample: 2009Q1 2017Q3   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags 
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 7 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
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Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -19.9844 0.0000 32 987 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -23.6474 0.0000 31 984 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 570.905 0.0000 32 987 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 688.113 0.0000 32 1013
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an 
asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume 
asymptotic normality. 
31 cross-sections, because time-series for Malaysia is not available 
 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -22.7917 0.0000 32 1007 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -22.8468 0.0000 31 1004 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 534.502 0.0000 32 1007 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 582.170 0.0000 32 1013 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an 
asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume 
asymptotic normality. 
31 cross-sections, because time-series for Malaysia is not available 
2. Pull factors  
Reserves? – Levels 
 
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags 
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 6 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.**sections Obs
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -18.6905 0.0000 32  1037
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -19.2097 0.0000 32 1037
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 454.110 0.0000 32 1037
PP - Fisher Chi-square 511.940 0.0000 32 1042
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an 
asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume 
asymptotic normality. 
 
INCOME_CAPI? – Levels 
 
Sample: 2009Q1 2017Q3   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags 
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 3 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -3.55113 0.0002 32 936
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat  -1.59924 0.0549 32 936
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 63.1275 0.5074 32 936
PP - Fisher Chi-square 119.818 0.0000 32 992
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an 
asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume 
asymptotic normality. 
DGDP? – Levels 
 
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags 
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 7 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -5.01091 0.0000 32 1035
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -1.99858 0.0228 32 1035
ADF – Fisher Chi-square 71.5150 0.2425 32 1035
PP – Fisher Chi-square 106.424 0.0007 32 1085
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an 
asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume 
asymptotic normality. 
 
CENTRALBANKRATE? – Levels 
 
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags 
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 3 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -9.36613 0.0000 32 1000
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -7.49575 0.0000 32 1000
ADF – Fisher Chi-square 158.455 0.0000 32 1000
PP – Fisher Chi-square 161.962 0.0000 32 1028
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an 
asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume 
asymptotic normality. 
 
Note: Variable appendix “?” refers to cross-sections. Tables display empirical realisations of Levin, Lin and Chu 
(2002), Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), Fisher-type tests using ADF and PP tests (Choi, 2001; Maddala & Wu, 1999). 
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Moreover, interest rates may also be considered stationary by definition (Thornton, 2014a; 
Thornton, 2014b). We thus take into account that the stochastic properties of interest rates 
(and differences of interest rates such as spreads) are always an issue. Some may argue that 
interest rates are I(0), no matter what formal tests may show. This could possibly be the 
case in the low-interest rate environment that we have faced for several years now and is 
part of our estimation period. 
Authors like Thornton (2014a; 2014b) argue that interest rates are extremely persistent, but 
they are not unit root processes. We know this for two reasons. If they were truly I(1) 
processes they would have wandered off long ago, but that is not the case. Moreover, 
economic theory shows that the real rate is bound and neither the US nor the economies 
included in our sample have experienced hyper-inflation during the period of study. Even if 
they had, these markets would have closed so the rates would not wander off. In cases of 
doubt, however, we rely on the results of our unit root tests as a sample property, which 
anyway in most of the cases coincide with this I(0) assessment. Taking the unit root tests 
conducted in this section as a point of reference, we use these stationary variables in our panel 
estimations of capital inflows to a wide array of emerging market and developing countries. 
4.2 Estimation results 
In the following, we present our panel estimation results, structured according to the three 
specific kinds of capital inflow considered here, that is FDI, portfolio and others (here, 
especially loans). The final selection is based on a comparison of the model-specific R-
squared and the other goodness-of-fit indicators mentioned in the result tables. In a few 
cases, variables are still part of the final empirical model if they are only marginally 
significant at the 10 per cent level but decisively contribute to the goodness-of-fit of the 
model. All models pass our redundant fixed effects test. Even in the final specifications, the 
R-squared is not extremely high, which is rather typical of capital flow regressions (“fickle 
investment”, IMF, 2011; Bluedorn et. al., 2013). We would like to stress again that the 
selected models are the “result” of a comparison of a multitude of regressions comprising 
all the variables listed in Appendix 1 and a systematic and rigorous Hendry-type selection 
process (Hendry, 1995). Hence, it does not come as a surprise that some of the variables are 
missing in the final specifications. 
Overall, we find interesting and significant results in accordance with theory. The “best” 
specifications overall result for gross (instead of net) capital flows and for absolute capital 
flow values (i.e., not for capital flows expressed as shares of GDP).21 Evidence for portfolio 
capital flows appears to be the broadest, that is, available for the largest set of model 
specifications based on our pull- and push factor distinction. 
We start with the presentation of our final results for FDI inflows (Table 3).22 As in the other 
result tables, the corresponding fixed effects redundancy tests precedes the main table 
containing the regression results. The estimates are all (highly) significant and the coefficients 
have the expected sign. The reserves coefficient is positive, suggesting that macroeconomic 
stability is conducive to attracting FDI. 
                                                 
21 However, the results for the latter are available on request. 
22 Please note again that “?” represents an index of the cross-sections, here: countries. 
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Table 3: Foreign direct investment inflows to emerging market and developing economies – 
 determinants according to an EGLS panel model 
Dependent variable: DIRINVLIAB?  
Method: Pooled EGLS (cross-section weights) 
Sample (adjusted): 2010Q2 2015Q4  
Included observations: 23 after adjustments 
Cross-sections included: 32  
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 729 
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Convergence achieved after 15 total coef iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 4.04E+09 2.72E+08 14.86847 0.0000 
RESERVES? 0.028184 0.008885 3.172237 0.0016 
EXR? -1.08E+08 34083689 -3.181425 0.0015 
CAPACCOPEN? 3.12E+08 1.40E+08 2.229252 0.0261 
INCOMECAPI? 113447.0 29137.01 3.893572 0.0001 
D(EPU) -468527.3 151781.1 -3.086861 0.0021 
AR(4) 0.167412 0.043007 3.892653 0.0001 
Fixed effects (cross) not listed    
     
 Effects specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
 Weighted statistics   
R-squared 0.846561 Mean dependent var 5.98E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.838345 S.D. dependent var 5.42E+09 
S.E. of regression 2.94E+09 Sum squared resid 5.96E+21 
F-statistic 103.0386 Durbin-Watson stat 1.910083 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000000    
 Unweighted statistics   
R-squared 0.923322 Mean dependent var 4.93E+09 
Sum squared resid 8.54E+21 Durbin-Watson stat 2.126364 
The exchange rates coefficient is negative, which means that economies with less flexible 
exchange rates attract more FDI. Given that nowadays FDI is often related to regional or 
global value chains, a fixed or managed exchange rate may facilitate cross-border trade in 
intermediate goods. The East Asian trade-production network, which developed under a 
relatively high degree of intra-regional exchange rate stability, is a case in point (Volz, 2010; 
Volz, 2015). 
Also, as expected, the capital account openness coefficient is positive, as is income per 
capita. Last but not least, the estimates suggest that higher global economic policy 
uncertainty has negative effects on FDI flows to developing and emerging economies. The 
policy uncertainty coefficient is highly significant at the one per cent level. It should be 
noted that variables pertaining to short-term financial conditions in both source and host 
countries did not appear to be significant, which is in line with expectations, since FDI is 
generally more long-term in nature and therefore less affected by short-term variables. 
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Table 4 shows the results for portfolio capital flows. The coefficient estimate for one of the 
most often stressed pull factors, the growth differential vis-à-vis the United States, is positive 
throughout, as expected, and significant at the 10 per cent level.23 The trade openness 
coefficient turns out to be significant and negative in Models 1 and 2. However, it is not 
contained in Model 3. At first glance, this comes as a surprise because one would expect that 
an economy that is more open to trade, and thereby integrated into the global economy, would 
receive more capital inflows and the sign would be positive. However, as argued in Section 
3, the trade-to-GDP ratio tends to be lower for larger economies. Hence, the sign of the trade 
openness variable in our capital inflow regression may well be negative. 
The estimated coefficient of reserves comes out as positive again (a pattern which proved 
to be very robust over all the specifications and estimations employed for this study), while 
the exchange rate coefficient is negative, suggesting that foreign portfolio investors are 
more inclined to invest when the exchange rate tends to be more stable. 
And once more, the estimate for global liquidity is positive and (highly) significant in 
Models 1 and 2 (and numerous specifications not displayed here because the goodness-of-
fit is slightly worse). It does not enter Model 3 which is characterised by a significantly 
shortened sample period due to the inclusion of the financial development variable. As in 
all other specifications (and in those not presented here as the final ones), the global liquidity 
variable constructed by the Bank for International Settlements beats the alternative OECD 
global liquidity specification (total OECD “broad money aggregate”) that we also 
implemented and tested. Recall that we use the BIS variable to indicate the ease of financing 
in global financial markets with credit being among the key indicators of global liquidity. 
We corroborate this concept empirically for portfolio capital inflows to emerging market 
and developing economies. This strongly corresponds with our priors because portfolio 
flows are obviously more closely connected with speculative capital flows than physical 
foreign investment or “other” investment, to include cross-border loans, which are among 
the most discussed side effects of global liquidity (Belke & Verheyen, 2014). 
In the context of our main research question it is important to note that the coefficient of the 
Baker-Bloom-Davis economic policy uncertainty variable is negative according to theory 
and highly significant in all three models. In other words, it has clearly beaten the VIX 
which does not enter any final model as an indicator of global uncertainty. 
The estimated coefficient of the US yield gap turns out to be negative and highly significant 
in Model 1.24 This corresponds with our prior that a lower yield gap can be considered a 
push factor for capital flows into developing and emerging economies, whose relative 
growth performance will then look better compared with the US. According to this view, 
our estimation results confirm the role of the US yield gap as an indicator of global risk that 
negatively impacts capital inflows to emerging market and developing economies. 
                                                 
23 The relatively low significance of the growth differential in our sample period ranging (only) from 2009 
to 2017 has become something like a stylised fact in the relevant literature. See, for instance, Hannan 
(2017) and IMF (2016b). In accordance with our results, Hannan (2017) finds that growth and interest 
rate differentials are not statistically significant for net FDI flows, but matter for portfolio and other 
investment flows to emerging markets. 
24 However, the yield gap does not enter Model 2, where the whole global liquidity and global risk impact 
is covered by the BIS global liquidity variable and the Baker-Bloom-Davis economic policy uncertainty 
index, nor Model 3, whose sample period is severely cut down due to the inclusion of the financial 
development variable. 
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Moreover, the negative sign of the US yield gap is compatible with the view described in 
Section 3 that this variable may also represent a (reverse) indicator of global liquidity 
instead of a global risk measure. The estimate for financial development turns out to be 
positive but only borderline significant.25 However, the inclusion of financial development 
comes at the cost of shortening the sample (from 30 to 22 observations). 
Table 4: Portfolio capital inflows to emerging market and developing economies – determinants 
 according to EGLS panel models 
Model 1 
Redundant fixed effects tests  
Test cross-section fixed effects  
Effects test Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F 10.577272 (30,856) 0.0000 
     
Dependent variable: PORTINVLIAB?  
Method: Pooled EGLS (cross-section weights) 
Sample (adjusted): 2009Q3 2016Q4  
Included observations: 30 after adjustments 
Cross-sections included: 31  
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 895 
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Convergence achieved after 18 total coef iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 6.68E+08 1.05E+09 0.639159 0.5229 
DGDP?(-1)-DGDP_US(-1) 79771.53 53482.46 1.491546 0.1362 
TRADEOPEN? -13354585 5567886. -2.398502 0.0167 
RESERVES? 0.091467 0.018777 4.871236 0.0000 
EXR? -2.64E+08 96653802 -2.730865 0.0064 
GLIBIS 95.65684 34.42670 2.778566 0.0056 
D(EPU) -3762771. 1076965. -3.493866 0.0005 
USYIELDGAP -76837970 28907576 -2.658057 0.0080 
AR(1) 0.131678 0.034788 3.785148 0.0002 
Fixed effects (cross) not listed    
 Effects specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
 Weighted statistics   
R-squared 0.431786 Mean dependent var 1.95E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.406562 S.D. dependent var 3.80E+09 
S.E. of regression 3.20E+09 Sum squared resid 8.74E+21 
F-statistic 17.11776 Durbin-Watson stat 2.006946 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000000    
 Unweighted statistics   
R-squared 0.389864 Mean dependent var 2.01E+09 
Sum squared resid 1.34E+22 Durbin-Watson stat 1.553726 
 
                                                 
25 It is contained only in Model 3 because its inclusion necessitates a significant shortening of the sample period. 
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Model 2 
Redundant fixed effects tests  
Test cross-section fixed effects  
Effects test Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F 10.055021 (30,857) 0.0000 
Dependent variable: PORTINVLIAB?  
Method: Pooled EGLS (cross-section weights) 
Sample (adjusted): 2009Q3 2016Q4  
Included observations: 30 after adjustments 
Cross-sections included: 31  
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 895 
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Convergence achieved after 16 total coef iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 6.39E+08 1.00E+09 0.637999 0.5236 
DGDP?(-1)-DGDP_US(-1) 87608.20 54330.01 1.612519 0.1072 
TRADEOPEN? -10499183 5719890. -1.835557 0.0668 
RESERVES? 0.093772 0.018780 4.993058 0.0000 
EXR? -2.70E+08 96434957 -2.799559 0.0052 
GLIBIS 77.49797 30.52355 2.538956 0.0113 
D(EPU) -4318630. 1233559. -3.500952 0.0005 
AR(1) 0.138438 0.033785 4.097588 0.0000 
Fixed effects (cross) not listed    
 Effects specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
 Weighted statistics   
R-squared 0.423245 Mean dependent var 1.95E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.398344 S.D. dependent var 3.80E+09 
S.E. of regression 3.21E+09 Sum squared resid 8.83E+21 
F-statistic 16.99727 Durbin-Watson stat 2.016800 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000000    
 Unweighted statistics   
R-squared 0.387560 Mean dependent var 2.01E+09 
Sum squared resid 1.35E+22 Durbin-Watson stat 1.558830 
 
 
Model 3 
Redundant fixed effects tests  
Test cross-section fixed effects  
Effects test Statistic d.f  Prob. 
Cross-section F 8.794579 (30,638) 0.0000 
 
Dependent variable: PORTINVLIAB?  
Method: Pooled EGLS (cross-section weights) 
Sample (adjusted): 2009Q3 2014Q4  
Included observations: 22 after adjustments 
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Cross-sections included: 31  
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 675 
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Convergence achieved after 16 total coef iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 1.22E+09 8.88E+08 1.377902 0.1687 
DGDP?(-1)-DGDP_US(-1) 86079.20 52235.45 1.647908 0.0999 
RESERVES? 0.051328 0.015387 3.335778 0.0009 
EXR? -2.09E+08 1.20E+08 -1.742708 0.0819 
FD? 3.55E+09 1.89E+09 1.880838 0.0604 
D(EPU) -2794202. 742096.5 -3.765281 0.0002 
AR(1) 0.085266 0.035931 2.373015 0.0179 
Fixed effects (cross) not listed    
 Effects specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
 Weighted statistics   
R-squared 0.505984 Mean dependent var 2.26E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.478108 S.D. dependent var 3.54E+09 
S.E. of regression 2.92E+09 Sum squared resid 5.46E+21 
F-statistic 18.15155 Durbin-Watson stat 2.029362 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000000    
 Unweighted statistics   
R-squared 0.521079 Mean dependent var 2.42E+09 
Sum squared resid 7.83E+21 Durbin-Watson stat 1.739841 
  
Finally, Table 5 displays the results for “other” capital flows, which, as mentioned, 
prominently include cross-border lending. As expected, the coefficient estimate for the 
growth differential vis-à-vis the US is positive and highly significant. The estimate for the 
reserves is again positive and highly significant. This time, in the context of “other” 
investment (mainly cross-border credits and loans) the US yield gap coefficient turns out to 
be positive, suggesting that a stable macro outlook in the host country and favourable 
growth outlook compared with the US will drive “other” flows into developing and 
emerging market economies.26 According to our main argument in Section 3, a weaker 
growth outlook for the US would be seen by investors as a signal of a cooling down of the 
world economy, that is, a global risk factor. In that case, a lower US yield gap would lead 
to less capital inflow to emerging market and developing economies (implying a positive 
sign of the yield gap coefficient). Thus, seen on the whole, “monetary” factors, such as 
reserves and the US yield gap, dominate the other push- and pull factors in the case of 
“other” investment flows. This confirms expectations since one important element of 
“other” investment are cross-border credit and loans.27 
                                                 
26 This does not constitute a contradiction of our finding of a negative sign of the yield gap variable for portfolio 
investment, i.e., in the context of more speculative capital flows rather than “other” investment (cross-border 
credits, loans). Remember also that the expected sign of the US yield gap in Section 3 was “+/-”. 
27 This is also systematically valid in those empirically inferior models that are not displayed here. 
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Table 5: Other capital inflows to emerging market and developing economies – determinants 
 according to an EGLS panel model 
Redundant fixed effects tests  
Test cross-section fixed effects  
Effects test Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F -2.077715 (31,912) 1.0000 
Dependent variable: OTHERINVLIAB?  
Method: Pooled EGLS (cross-section weights) 
Sample (adjusted): 2009Q4 2017Q3  
Included observations: 32 after adjustments 
Cross-sections included: 32  
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 949 
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Convergence achieved after 17 total coef iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 1.21E+09 64592641 18.80802 0.0000 
DGDP?-DGDP_US 198621.3 23923.39 8.302390 0.0000 
RESERVES? 0.229797 0.019769 11.62381 0.0000 
USYIELDGAP 19880802 8699427. 2.285300 0.0225 
AR(1) 0.106320 0.033863 3.139682 0.0017 
AR(3) 0.104686 0.036489 2.868962 0.0042 
Fixed effects (cross) not listed    
 Effects specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
 Weighted statistics   
R-squared 0.416924 Mean dependent var -4.11E+11 
Adjusted R-squared 0.393908 S.D. dependent var 1.27E+13 
S.E. of regression 6.84E+09 Sum squared resid 4.27E+22 
F-statistic 18.11439 Durbin-Watson stat 2.057792 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000000    
 Unweighted statistics   
R-squared 0.479240 Mean dependent var 1.71E+09 
Sum squared resid 6.78E+22 Durbin-Watson stat 1.265043 
 
A final striking observation is that almost no institutional pull factor variables enter the final 
model specifications. This is most probably due to the fact that institutional variables often 
move slowly and thus, may not show a significant impact over the relatively small 
estimation period considered here. They thus also tend to interact strongly with fixed effects 
and hence rarely appear in the “best” specifications displayed above. Finally, it is well-
known that fixed effects absorb most of the explanatory power of institutional variables and 
estimates of these variables become inefficient, although coefficients are provided for 
variables that hardly change over time (Pluemper & Troeger, 2007). 
Capital flows to emerging market and developing economies 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 25 
What is more, the pull factor “central bank rate (relative to the US rate)” is not included 
among the variables of the final best-performing models, regardless of the category of 
capital flows used as the independent variable. 
As expected, growth differentials of the emerging market and developing economies vis-à-
vis the US are robust entries in all specifications except for FDI, where per capita income 
substitutes for the growth differential. However, as in IMF (2016b) and Hannan (2017), 
significance turned out to be comparatively weak (i.e., at the 10 per cent level throughout). 
Furthermore, it turned out that cyclical push factors, like global risk aversion (the economic 
policy uncertainty variable EPU appears in all but one of the best specifications tabulated 
above) and global liquidity measures (as defined by the BIS)28, are most important for 
portfolio capital inflows to emerging market and developing economies. In this respect, we 
come up with larger and more systematic effects of global variables than Foerster, Jorra and 
Tillmann (2014) who show empirically in dynamic panel and time-series regressions that 
their global factor, reflecting US financial conditions, explains only a small share of the 
overall variation of capital flows to emerging market and developing economies. 
As expected, policy uncertainty was, combined with a couple of country-specific factors 
like real GDP growth, more important in our estimations for FDI in emerging market and 
developing economies. We now turn to some robustness checks, especially with respect to 
the heterogeneity of countries in our sample. 
4.3 Robustness checks 
To check for robustness of our results, we conduct two variants of robustness checks. First, 
we confine our cross-sections to the upper-middle-income and high-income economies 
(according to the latest World Bank classification) in our sample and estimate the 
specifications identified in Section 4.2 anew. And second, we estimate our specifications 
for the different categories of capital flows for only lower-middle-income economies.29 
Panel unit root tests have been conducted for each of the two different scenarios with similar 
results as for the entire sample. They are available on request. 
4.3.1 Estimations for upper-middle-income and high-income economies 
We start with our robustness checks for our FDI equations in Table 6. The results reveal 
that both the exchange rate regime and capital account openness variables become 
insignificant once our country sample is restricted to upper-middle-income and higher-
income economies (Model 1). However, the remaining variables, among them policy 
uncertainty, stay highly significant. What is more, the signs of the estimated coefficients 
stay the same. If we delete the insignificant variables from the approach, the final 
specification, shown as Model 2 in Table 6, emerges. Economic policy uncertainty remains 
significant (at the five per cent level). Thus, seen on the whole, the empirical model of FDI 
                                                 
28 The BIS global liquidity indicator worked much better in our estimations than our OECD definition of 
global liquidity. 
29 As mentioned before, low-income economies are not included in our sample due to a lack of data. 
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flows stays remarkably unchanged if lower-middle-income economies are excluded from 
our panel – both with respect to the magnitude of the estimated coefficients and their signs. 
Table 6:  Foreign direct investment inflows to upper-middle-income and high-income economies – 
 determinants according to an EGLS panel model 
Model 1 
Redundant fixed effects tests  
Test cross-section fixed effects  
Effects test Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F 83.100501 (24,544) 0.0000 
Dependent variable: DIRINVLIAB?  
Method: Pooled EGLS (cross-section weights) 
Sample (adjusted): 2010Q2 2015Q4  
Included observations: 23 after adjustments 
Cross-sections included: 25  
Total pool (balanced) observations: 575  
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Convergence achieved after 13 total coef iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 4.96E+09 4.70E+08 10.55254 0.0000 
RESERVES? 0.035135 0.010042 3.498597 0.0005 
EXR? -1.23E+08 1.31E+08 -0.938453 0.3484 
CAPACCOPEN? 2.69E+08 2.20E+08 1.225293 0.2210 
INCOMECAPI? 69536.30 27935.04 2.489214 0.0131 
D(EPU) -867621.0 198210.0 -4.377282 0.0000 
AR(4) 0.132989 0.050784 2.618739 0.0091 
Fixed effects (cross) Not listed    
 Effects specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
 Weighted statistics   
R-squared 0.835884 Mean dependent var 6.22E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.826833 S.D. dependent var 6.05E+09 
S.E. of regression 3.23E+09 Sum squared resid 5.66E+21 
F-statistic 92.35755 Durbin-Watson stat 1.931174 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000000    
 Unweighted statistics   
R-squared 0.922874 Mean dependent var 5.58E+09 
Sum squared resid 8.38E+21 Durbin-Watson stat 2.161119 
Model 2 
Redundant fixed effects tests  
Test cross-section fixed effects  
Effects test Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F 60.272436 (24,646) 0.0000 
Dependent variable: DIRINVLIAB?  
Method: Pooled EGLS (cross-section weights) 
Sample (adjusted): 2010Q2 2016Q4  
Included observations: 27 after adjustments 
Cross-sections included: 25  
Total pool (balanced) observations: 675  
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Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Convergence achieved after 15 total coef iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 5.05E+09 1.76E+08 28.64018 0.0000 
RESERVES? 0.037018 0.010724 3.451912 0.0006 
INCOMECAPI? 43665.01 19633.95 2.223954 0.0265 
D(EPU) -429531.4 217646.3 -1.973529 0.0489 
AR(4) 0.129526 0.041157 3.147096 0.0017 
Fixed effects (cross) not listed    
 Effects specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
 Weighted statistics   
R-squared 0.811201 Mean dependent var 8.29E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.803018 S.D. dependent var 7.04E+09 
S.E. of regression 4.29E+09 Sum squared resid 1.19E+22 
F-statistic 99.12975 Durbin-Watson stat 1.816003 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000000    
 Unweighted statistics   
R-squared 0.864609 Mean dependent var 5.49E+09 
Sum squared resid 1.67E+22 Durbin-Watson stat 1.649265 
Table 7 displays the results of our portfolio capital inflow estimations when we restrict our 
sample to upper-middle-income and high-income economies. The significance of the 
growth differential clearly increases in all models. In addition, financial development now 
enters Model 3 significantly. Policy uncertainty (in Models 1 and 2, but not in Model 3) 
becomes slightly less significant (at the 10 and five per cent levels instead of the one per 
cent level). The same is true for global liquidity, which nonetheless remains significant at 
the one per cent level (Model 1) and two per cent level (Model 2). Importantly, the signs of 
the estimated coefficients stay unchanged vis-à-vis our basic specification including all 
countries. 
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Table 7: Portfolio capital inflows to upper-middle-income and high-income– determinants 
 according to EGLS panel models 
Model 1 
Redundant fixed effects tests  
Pool: DIE_PORTFOLIO   
Test cross-section fixed effects  
Effects test Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F 9.111688 (23,639) 0.0000 
Dependent variable: PORTINVLIAB?  
Method: Pooled EGLS (cross-section weights) 
Sample (adjusted): 2010Q1 2016Q4  
Included observations: 28 after adjustments 
Cross-sections included: 24  
Total pool (balanced) observations: 672  
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Convergence achieved after 18 total coef iterations 
Cross-sections without valid observations dropped 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 1.21E+09 1.18E+09 1.027515 0.3046 
DGDP?(-1)-DGDP_US(-1) 101067.6 20956.11 4.822819 0.0000 
TRADEOPEN? -15545305 7973086. -1.949723 0.0516 
RESERVES? 0.078139 0.021169 3.691101 0.0002 
EXR? -3.06E+08 93972047 -3.253040 0.0012 
GLIBIS 94.39884 38.49047 2.452525 0.0145 
D(EPU) -2307356. 1389868. -1.660126 0.0974 
USYIELDGAP -90399153 40386377 -2.238358 0.0255 
AR(1) 0.103892 0.047288 2.196991 0.0284 
AR(3) 0.104174 0.034597 3.011071 0.0027 
Fixed effects (cross) not listed    
 Effects specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
 Weighted statistics   
R-squared 0.422472 Mean dependent var 2.09E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.393550 S.D. dependent var 4.03E+09 
S.E. of regression 3.40E+09 Sum squared resid 7.40E+21 
F-statistic 14.60748 Durbin-Watson stat 1.984146 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000000    
 Unweighted statistics   
R-squared 0.401446 Mean dependent var 2.08E+09 
Sum squared resid 1.11E+22 Durbin-Watson stat 1.594512 
Model 2 
Redundant fixed effects tests  
Pool: DIE_PORTFOLIO   
Test cross-section fixed effects  
Effects test Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F 8.887239 (23,640) 0.0000 
Dependent variable: PORTINVLIAB?  
Method: Pooled EGLS (cross-section weights) 
Sample (adjusted): 2010Q1 2016Q4  
Included observations: 28 after adjustments 
Cross-sections included: 24  
Total pool (balanced) observations: 672  
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Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Convergence achieved after 16 total coef iterations 
Cross-sections without valid observations dropped 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 9.81E+08 1.12E+09 0.872098 0.3835 
DGDP?(-1)-DGDP_US(-1) 97466.80 20918.97 4.659254 0.0000 
TRADEOPEN? -14007425 7987010. -1.753776 0.0799 
RESERVES? 0.081108 0.021159 3.833333 0.0001 
EXR? -2.95E+08 92466106 -3.190346 0.0015 
GLIBIS 82.11938 34.26174 2.396825 0.0168 
D(EPU) -3009404. 1538065. -1.956617 0.0508 
AR(1) 0.108625 0.045790 2.372278 0.0180 
AR(3) 0.103772 0.035534 2.920379 0.0036 
Fixed effects (cross) not listed    
 Effects specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
 Weighted statistics   
R-squared 0.418489 Mean dependent var 2.10E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.390322 S.D. dependent var 4.03E+09 
S.E. of regression 3.43E+09 Sum squared resid 7.51E+21 
F-statistic 14.85747 Durbin-Watson stat 1.988068 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000000    
 Unweighted statistics   
R-squared 0.398046 Mean dependent var 2.08E+09 
Sum squared resid 1.11E+22 Durbin-Watson stat 1.592389 
Model 3 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests  
Pool: DIE_PORTFOLIO   
Test cross-section fixed effects  
Effects Test Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F 9.368617 (24,468) 0.0000 
Dependent variable: PORTINVLIAB?  
Method: Pooled EGLS (cross-section weights) 
Sample (adjusted): 2010Q1 2014Q4  
Included observations: 20 after adjustments 
Cross-sections included: 25  
Total pool (balanced) observations: 500  
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Convergence achieved after 16 total coef iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 6.73E+08 1.05E+09 0.641134 0.5217 
DGDP?(-1)-DGDP_US(-1) 95560.79 21102.52 4.528408 0.0000 
RESERVES? 0.042072 0.016523 2.546241 0.0112 
EXR? -2.55E+08 1.02E+08 -2.512788 0.0123 
FD? 5.24E+09 2.36E+09 2.224981 0.0266 
D(EPU) -2245051. 719552.0 -3.120068 0.0019 
AR(1) 0.032551 0.053734 0.605781 0.5450 
AR(3) 0.074167 0.050776 1.460674 0.1448 
Fixed effects (cross) not listed    
 Effects specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
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 Weighted statistics   
R-squared 0.524914 Mean dependent var 2.46E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.493444 S.D. dependent var 3.71E+09 
S.E. of regression 3.04E+09 Sum squared resid 4.33E+21 
F-statistic 16.68014 Durbin-Watson stat 1.983428 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000000    
 Unweighted statistics   
R-squared 0.532859 Mean dependent var 2.54E+09 
Sum squared resid 6.28E+21 Durbin-Watson stat 1.705624 
For other capital flows (Table 8), the US yield gap remains positive but becomes insignificant 
once our country panel is limited to the upper-middle-income and higher-income countries. 
The coefficient estimate for the growth differential vis-à-vis the US becomes insignificant and 
is thus left out of our specification. The estimate for the reserves is again positive and highly 
significant. 
Table 8: Other capital inflows to upper-middle-income and high-income economies – 
 determinants according to an EGLS panel model 
Redundant fixed effects tests  
Pool: DIE_OTHERS   
Test cross-section fixed effects  
Effects test Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F -0.491272 (24,713) 1.0000 
Dependent variable: OTHERINVLIAB?  
Method: Pooled EGLS (cross-section weights) 
Sample (adjusted): 2009Q4 2017Q3  
Included observations: 32 after adjustments 
Cross-sections included: 25  
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 742 
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Convergence achieved after 17 total coef iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 9.38E+08 74606591 12.57056 0.0000 
RESERVES? 0.227925 0.026999 8.441946 0.0000 
USYIELDGAP 12142545 9367865. 1.296191 0.1953 
AR(1) 0.122034 0.036018 3.388100 0.0007 
AR(3) 0.091544 0.038270 2.392093 0.0170 
Fixed effects (cross) not listed    
 Effects specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
 Weighted statistics   
R-squared 0.360768 Mean dependent var -6.75E+10 
Adjusted R-squared 0.335665 S.D. dependent var 1.89E+12 
S.E. of regression 7.45E+09 Sum squared resid 3.96E+22 
F-statistic 14.37149 Durbin-Watson stat 2.042872 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000000    
 Unweighted statistics   
R-squared 0.466743 Mean dependent var 1.44E+09 
Sum squared resid 6.50E+22 Durbin-Watson stat 1.252361 
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To summarise, replicating the estimations with data for only upper-middle-income and 
high-income economies, the empirical models stay largely unchanged – both with respect 
to the magnitude of the estimated coefficients and their signs. In particular, we find that the 
coefficient estimates for global liquidity and policy uncertainty remain highly significant in 
those specifications in which they were previously significant. 
4.3.2 Separate estimations for lower-middle-income economies 
Finally, we present the results of our estimations of capital inflows to lower-middle-income 
economies. As can be seen in the results for FDI in Model 1 in Table 9, the reserves variable 
becomes insignificant and the exchange rate regime variable turns out to be less significant 
(at 10 per cent instead of one per cent), but capital account openness matters more (one 
instead of five per cent) for FDI flows. Most importantly, with an eye on our main research 
question, policy uncertainty becomes insignificant as a driver of FDI in lower-middle-
income economies (Table 9, Model 1). If we delete the remaining insignificant variable, 
Model 2 results. 
Table 9: Foreign direct investment inflows to lower-middle-income economies – determinants 
 according to an EGLS panel model 
Model 1 
Redundant fixed effects tests  
Test cross-section fixed effects  
Effects test Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F 17.739037 (6,141) 0.0000 
Dependent variable: DIRINVLIAB?  
Method: Pooled EGLS (cross-section weights) 
Sample (adjusted): 2010Q2 2015Q4  
Included observations: 23 after adjustments 
Cross-sections included: 7   
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 154 
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Convergence achieved after 14 total coef iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 1.68E+09 5.83E+08 2.879641 0.0046 
RESERVES? 0.018273 0.014724 1.240990 0.2167 
EXR? -1.49E+08 87009105 -1.709945 0.0895 
CAPACCOPEN? 5.65E+08 2.30E+08 2.454187 0.0153 
INCOMECAPI? 330615.4 131967.1 2.505285 0.0134 
D(EPU) 161072.2 353585.8 0.455539 0.6494 
AR(4) 0.250706 0.081111 3.090917 0.0024 
Fixed effects (Cross) not listed    
 Effects specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
 Weighted statistics   
R-squared 0.871535 Mean dependent var 2.39E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.860601 S.D. dependent var 1.66E+09 
S.E. of regression 1.01E+09 Sum squared resid 1.45E+20 
F-statistic 79.71439 Durbin-Watson stat 1.884945 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000000    
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 Unweighted statistics   
R-squared 0.883174 Mean dependent var 2.50E+09 
Sum squared resid 1.75E+20 Durbin-Watson stat 1.580328 
Model 2 
Redundant fixed effects tests  
Pool: DIE_FDI   
Test cross-section fixed effects  
Effects test Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F 13.236856 (6,149) 0.0000 
Dependent variable: DIRINVLIAB?  
Method: Pooled EGLS (cross-section weights) 
Sample (adjusted): 2010Q1 2015Q4  
Included observations: 24 after adjustments 
Cross-sections included: 7   
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 160 
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Convergence achieved after 12 total coef iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 1.82E+09 4.84E+08 3.759891 0.0002 
EXR? -1.69E+08 76130456 -2.218762 0.0280 
CAPACCOPEN? 4.55E+08 1.97E+08 2.304596 0.0226 
INCOMECAPI? 310566.6 111348.6 2.789139 0.0060 
AR(4) 0.249543 0.069928 3.568571 0.0005 
Fixed effects (cross) not listed    
 Effects specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
 Weighted statistics   
R-squared 0.857585 Mean dependent var 2.48E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.848027 S.D. dependent var 1.64E+09 
S.E. of regression 1.07E+09 Sum squared resid 1.72E+20 
F-statistic 89.72386 Durbin-Watson stat 1.913182 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000000    
 Unweighted statistics   
R-squared 0.879046 Mean dependent var 2.48E+09 
Sum squared resid 1.85E+20 Durbin-Watson stat 1.498657 
We now check whether limiting our focus to lower-middle-income economies alters our 
empirical results for portfolio capital flows too (Table 10). The trade openness variable 
becomes insignificant while the global liquidity and the US yield gap variables become 
slightly less significant as drivers of portfolio capital flows (Model 1). However, policy 
uncertainty remains highly significant. In Model 2, trade openness becomes insignificant 
again and both the exchange rate regime and the global liquidity variable become slightly 
less significant. What is more, as in Model 1, the growth differential appears to be less 
important than in the case of the complete country sample. However, policy uncertainty 
remains highly significant. As far as Model 3 is concerned, the exchange rate regime 
becomes a bit more significant, but financial development remains insignificant. In all other 
respects, the main empirical pattern of the model stays more or less the same. Above all, 
Capital flows to emerging market and developing economies 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 33 
policy uncertainty remains highly significant. If we eliminate the insignificant financial 
development variable, Model 4 emerges as our final model specification. 
Table 10: Portfolio capital inflows to lower-middle-income economies – determinants according to  
 EGLS panel models 
Model 1 
Redundant fixed effects tests  
Pool: DIE_PORTFOLIO   
Test cross-section fixed effects  
Effects test Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F -0.062195 (6,188) 1.0000 
Dependent variable: PORTINVLIAB?  
Method: Pooled EGLS (cross-section weights) 
Sample (adjusted): 2009Q3 2016Q4  
Included observations: 30 after adjustments 
Cross-sections included: 7   
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 203 
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Convergence achieved after 17 total coef iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -8.16E+08 1.36E+09 -0.601645 0.5481 
DGDP?(-1)-DGDP_US(-1) 55058.38 47809.83 1.151612 0.2509 
TRADEOPEN? 582539.1 17177950 0.033912 0.9730 
RESERVES? 0.313747 0.031039 10.10804 0.0000 
EXR? -2.59E+08 1.07E+08 -2.406719 0.0171 
GLIBIS 85.58358 40.96307 2.089286 0.0380 
D(EPU) -6955256. 1174891. -5.919916 0.0000 
USYIELDGAP -68200480 31701886 -2.151307 0.0327 
AR(1) 0.088766 0.059558 1.490409 0.1378 
Fixed effects (cross) not listed    
 Effects specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
 Weighted statistics   
R-squared 0.536079 Mean dependent var 1.24E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.501532 S.D. dependent var 2.88E+09 
S.E. of regression 2.15E+09 Sum squared resid 8.69E+20 
F-statistic 15.51727 Durbin-Watson stat 1.977501 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000000    
 Unweighted statistics   
R-squared 0.400777 Mean dependent var 1.39E+09 
Sum squared resid 1.40E+21 Durbin-Watson stat 1.686182 
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Model 2 
Redundant fixed effects tests  
Pool: DIE_PORTFOLIO   
Test cross-section fixed effects  
Effects test Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F -0.188897 (6,189) 1.0000 
Dependent variable: PORTINVLIAB?  
Method: Pooled EGLS (cross-section weights) 
Sample (adjusted): 2009Q3 2016Q4  
Included observations: 30 after adjustments 
Cross-sections included: 7   
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 203 
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Convergence achieved after 17 total coef iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -8.62E+08 1.31E+09 -0.656300 0.5124 
DGDP?(-1)-DGDP_US(-1) 61936.10 49093.62 1.261592 0.2087 
TRADEOPEN? 1411365. 17584646 0.080261 0.9361 
RESERVES? 0.315270 0.030569 10.31335 0.0000 
EXR? -2.47E+08 1.11E+08 -2.227564 0.0271 
GLIBIS 73.14237 42.80851 1.708594 0.0892 
D(EPU) -7514721. 1180053. -6.368123 0.0000 
AR(1) 0.092136 0.060449 1.524200 0.1291 
Fixed effects (cross) not listed    
 Effects specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
 Weighted statistics   
R-squared 0.533147 Mean dependent var 1.24E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.501035 S.D. dependent var 2.88E+09 
S.E. of regression 2.15E+09 Sum squared resid 8.74E+20 
F-statistic 16.60294 Durbin-Watson stat 1.981026 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000000    
 Unweighted statistics   
R-squared 0.401597 Mean dependent var 1.39E+09 
Sum squared resid 1.40E+21 Durbin-Watson stat 1.694093 
Model 3 
Redundant fixed effects tests  
Test cross-section fixed effects  
Effects test Statistic d.f. Prob.
Cross-section F 1.183356 (6,134) 0.3189 
Dependent variable: PORTINVLIAB?  
Method: Pooled EGLS (cross-section weights) 
Sample (adjusted): 2009Q3 2014Q4  
Included observations: 22 after adjustments 
Cross-sections included: 7   
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 147 
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Convergence achieved after 13 total coef iterations 
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Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob.
C 5.92E+08 2.19E+09 0.270539 0.7872 
DGDP?(-1)-DGDP_US(-1) 68463.05 49553.58 1.381596 0.1694 
RESERVES? 0.308494 0.040114 7.690473 0.0000 
EXR? -2.59E+08 1.05E+08 -2.468311 0.0148 
FD? 4.39E+09 7.01E+09 0.626485 0.5321 
D(EPU) -6240578. 1497676. -4.166841 0.0001 
AR(1) 0.069625 0.067422 1.032678 0.3036 
Fixed effects (cross) not listed    
 Effects specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
 Weighted statistics   
R-squared 0.581702 Mean dependent var 1.49E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.544243 S.D. dependent var 2.98E+09 
S.E. of regression 2.18E+09 Sum squared resid 6.38E+20 
F-statistic 15.52884 Durbin-Watson stat 1.993288 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000000    
 Unweighted statistics   
R-squared 0.468446 Mean dependent var 1.65E+09 
Sum squared resid 9.15E+20 Durbin-Watson stat 1.982117 
Model 4 
Redundant fixed effects tests  
Pool: DIE_PORTFOLIO   
Test cross-section fixed effects  
Effects test Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F -0.342723 (6,202) 1.0000 
Dependent variable: PORTINVLIAB?  
Method: Pooled EGLS (cross-section weights) 
Date: 07/10/18 Time: 10:50  
Sample (adjusted): 2009Q3 2017Q2  
Included observations: 32 after adjustments 
Cross-sections included: 7   
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 215 
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Convergence achieved after 11 total coef iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -1.45E+09 1.39E+09 -1.042693 0.2983 
RESERVES? 0.348657 0.043290 8.053904 0.0000 
EXR? -2.22E+08 1.04E+08 -2.139744 0.0336 
GLIBIS 107.0535 40.05656 2.672559 0.0081 
D(EPU) -6566847. 1054873. -6.225252 0.0000 
USYIELDGAP -78901392 33865517 -2.329845 0.0208 
AR(1) 0.151739 0.094202 1.610778 0.1088 
Fixed effects (cross) not listed    
 Effects specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
 Weighted statistics   
R-squared 0.503830 Mean dependent var 1.41E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.474354 S.D. dependent var 3.03E+09 
S.E. of regression 2.34E+09 Sum squared resid 1.10E+21 
F-statistic 17.09320 Durbin-Watson stat 1.953456 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000000    
Ansgar Belke / Ulrich Volz 
36 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
 Unweighted statistics   
R-squared 0.406032 Mean dependent var 1.50E+09 
Sum squared resid 1.55E+21 Durbin-Watson stat 1.974359 
Finally, we check whether and how our empirical results for other investment capital inflows 
change, once we focus only on lower-middle-income countries (Table 11). Overall, the 
specification very much resembles that gained for the full country sample, except for the 
US yield gap, which even increases in significance. 
Table 11: Other capital inflows to lower-middle-income economies – determinants according to an 
 EGLS panel model 
Model 1 
Redundant fixed effects tests  
Test cross-section fixed effects  
Effects test Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F 6.741688 (6,195) 0.0000 
Dependent variable: OTHERINVLIAB?  
Method: Pooled EGLS (cross-section weights) 
Sample (adjusted): 2009Q4 2017Q2  
Included observations: 31 after adjustments 
Cross-sections included: 7   
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 207 
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Convergence achieved after 16 total coef iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 2.20E+09 1.12E+08 19.67850 0.0000 
DGDP?-DGDP_US 172067.4 28432.60 6.051767 0.0000 
RESERVES? 0.234355 0.045006 5.207173 0.0000 
USYIELDGAP 53378854 20481747 2.606167 0.0099 
AR(1) 0.014367 0.071700 0.200379 0.8414 
AR(3) 0.174398 0.058970 2.957405 0.0035 
Fixed effects (cross) not listed    
 Effects specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
 Weighted statistics   
R-squared 0.487896 Mean dependent var 2.01E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.459009 S.D. dependent var 3.87E+09 
S.E. of regression 3.13E+09 Sum squared resid 1.91E+21 
F-statistic 16.88930 Durbin-Watson stat 2.117192 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000000    
 Unweighted statistics   
R-squared 0.715158 Mean dependent var 2.68E+09 
Sum squared resid 2.28E+21 Durbin-Watson stat 2.294681 
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Model 2 
Redundant fixed effects tests  
Test cross-section fixed effects  
Effects test Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F 8.675212 (6,196) 0.0000 
Dependent variable: OTHERINVLIAB?  
Method: Pooled EGLS (cross-section weights) 
Sample (adjusted): 2009Q4 2017Q2  
Included observations: 31 after adjustments 
Cross-sections included: 7   
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 207 
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Convergence achieved after 16 total coef iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 2.20E+09 1.12E+08 19.66612 0.0000 
DGDP?-DGDP_US 167646.1 22168.95 7.562205 0.0000 
RESERVES? 0.234208 0.044104 5.310310 0.0000 
USYIELDGAP 54008987 20627009 2.618363 0.0095 
AR(3) 0.179588 0.059693 3.008549 0.0030 
Fixed effects (cross) not listed    
 Effects specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
 Weighted statistics   
R-squared 0.482044 Mean dependent var 2.03E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.455618 S.D. dependent var 3.91E+09 
S.E. of regression 3.17E+09 Sum squared resid 1.97E+21 
F-statistic 18.24108 Durbin-Watson stat 2.078355 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000000    
 Unweighted statistics   
R-squared 0.715656 Mean dependent var 2.68E+09 
Sum squared resid 2.28E+21 Durbin-Watson stat 2.265708 
Having compared the results of our two variants of robustness checks with those based on 
our basic (full-sample) specifications (Tables 3-5), we now compare the results for upper-
middle-income and high-income countries (Tables 6-8) vis-à-vis those for lower-middle-
income countries (Tables 9-11).  
For FDI flows, the exchange rate regime and capital account openness appear to matter 
more, in terms of significance, for capital flows to the lower-middle-income economies than 
for those to the upper-middle-income and high-income economies. The growth differential 
is much more significant for portfolio capital flows to the upper-middle-income and high-
income economies than for the lower-middle-income economies.30 Except FDI flows, 
policy uncertainty matters much more for capital flows to lower-middle-income economies 
than for flows to the upper-middle-income and high-income economies. Global liquidity 
turns out to be significant in explaining portfolio capital flows for both sub-groups but even 
                                                 
30 For the category “other flows”, however, the growth differential becomes insignificant in the case of the 
upper-middle-income and high-income economies. 
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more significant for the upper-middle-income and high-income economies (Table 7, Model 
2, vs. Table 10, Model 2) 
For portfolio capital flows, the trade openness variable is highly significant for the upper-
middle-income and high-income economies but becomes insignificant in the case of lower-
middle-income countries (Table 7, Models 1 and 2, vs. Table 10, Models 1 and 2). In the 
same category of capital flows, financial developments is significant at the five per cent 
level for upper-middle-income and high-income economies but insignificant for lower-
middle-income economies (Table 7, Model 3, vs. Table 10, Model 3). 
For other capital flows, the US yield gap is slightly insignificant for the upper-middle-
income and high-income economies but turns out to be significant at the one per cent level 
in the case of the lower-middle-income economies. In all other respects, the estimation 
results are generally comparable among both country samples. Overall, splitting the sample 
into two sub-groups yields relatively similar results to those obtained when using the entire 
sample, hence confirming the robustness of the analysis. 
5 Conclusions and outlook 
Our panel estimation results confirm that a combination of pull- and push factors are 
significant drivers of capital flows. The coefficient estimate for one of the most often 
stressed pull factors, the growth differential vis-à-vis the US, turns out to be positive, as 
expected, and significant at the 10 per cent level for nearly all of our final model 
specifications. In addition, all our final empirical models reveal the robust role of foreign 
reserves as a pull factor for capital inflows to emerging market and developing economies. 
In this sense, improving macroeconomic fundamentals and thus lowering sovereign risk 
premia would help emerging market and developing economies with higher external 
financing needs to receive higher equity inflows in times of rising policy uncertainty 
(Gauvin, McLoughlin, & Reinhardt, 2014). Both characteristics are textbook-style and 
underline the plausibility and consistency of our final empirical models. 
However, there is considerable variation in the results across the different variants of capital 
flows (FDI, portfolio capital flows, “other” investment) to developing and emerging market 
economies. Overall, according to our results, the “push- and pull factor” model of capital 
inflows receives the broadest empirical support in the case of portfolio flows. 
For FDI, macroeconomic stability (captured by high foreign exchange reserves), relatively 
stable exchange rates, capital account openness, and high income per capita appear as the 
most important variables contributing to FDI inflows, while higher global economic policy 
uncertainty clearly has an adverse effect. Variables capturing short-term financial 
conditions in both source and host countries turn out to be less relevant (i.e., they do not 
enter the final best model specifications), which is in line with expectations given that FDI 
is generally longer-term in nature. 
Portfolio flows to developing and emerging market economies are affected by the growth 
differential vis-à-vis the US (except in one case where the effect is substituted by the effect 
of per capita income), trade openness, reserves, and exchange rate stability. The trade 
openness coefficient turns out to be significant and negative mainly because the trade-to-GDP 
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ratio tends to be lower for larger economies. The estimated coefficient of reserves comes out 
as positive again, a pattern that proved to be very robust over all the specifications and 
estimations employed for our whole study. Moreover, the exchange rate coefficient turns out 
to be negative, suggesting that foreign portfolio investors are more inclined to invest when 
the exchange rate tends to be more stable. While investors holding foreign equities are 
inevitably exposed to exchange rate fluctuations and hence sensitive to exchange rate changes, 
local currency bond markets have been growing rapidly across emerging market and 
developing economies (Berensmann, Dafe, & Volz, 2015; Dafe, Essers, & Volz, 2018), 
making fixed income investors in these markets more sensitive to exchange rate swings. 
And once more, the estimates for global liquidity are positive and highly significant 
throughout. In this context it is important to note that the global liquidity variable constructed 
by the BIS beats the alternative OECD global liquidity measure (“broad money aggregate”) 
in all specifications. This variable indicates the importance of the ease of financing in global 
financial markets, with credit being among the key indicators of global liquidity for portfolio 
capital inflows to emerging market and developing economies. Overall, this appears plausible 
since portfolio flows are obviously more closely connected to speculative capital flows than 
physical foreign investment or “other” investment. The latter includes cross-border loans, 
which are among the most discussed side effects of global liquidity. 
In the context of our main research question it is also important to note that the coefficient 
estimates of the Baker-Bloom-Davis global economic policy uncertainty variable are 
negative, in line with theoretical expectations, and highly significant in all three final models 
for portfolio flows (as well as in the final model for FDI flows). In many cases, it enters 
simultaneously with our BIS global liquidity indicator. 
The US yield gap turns out to be negative in the case of portfolio flows (but positive for 
“other” investment, i.e., cross-border credit and loans). In the case of portfolio flows, we 
thus interpret the US yield gap as an indicator of global risk that negatively impacts capital 
inflows to emerging market and developing economies. 
Other capital flows, including cross-border lending, respond strongly to the growth 
differential vis-à-vis the US and “monetary” factors, such as foreign exchange reserves, and 
the US yield gap. Here, in the context of cross-border loans, the US yield gap enters with a 
positive sign and thus seems to serve as a sign of global liquidity rather than global risk.  
When controlling for differences amongst country groups, the results we get when including 
only upper-middle-income and high-income economies, and lower-middle income 
economies, respectively, are broadly in line with the results obtained with the full sample, 
confirming the overall robustness of the analysis. 
Overall, we corroborate the earlier Bruno and Shin (2013) result that global (push) factors 
dominate local (pull) factors as determinants of capital inflows to emerging market and 
developing economies. We support the findings of Foerster, Jorra and Tillmann (2014) in 
the sense that they also find a consistent and robust impact of global push factors but are 
not able to support their finding of a dominance of country-specific pull factors over global 
push factors. 
To conclude, our estimation results imply that the slowdown and (to a certain extent) the 
higher variability of portfolio flows to emerging market and developing economies in recent 
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years (as visible in Appendix 5) may be due to lower growth prospects of the recipient 
countries, worse global risk sentiment and lower global liquidity (as evidenced in Appendix 
16), combined with higher policy uncertainty (as displayed in Appendix 12). Higher policy 
uncertainty appears to have led to an option value of waiting under uncertainty with foreign 
direct and portfolio investment in emerging market and developing economies. This is not 
least because the US acts as the safe haven for international capital flows in times of high 
policy uncertainty (Gauvin, McLoughlin, and Reinhardt, 2014), making it very difficult for 
emerging market and developing economies to attract foreign capital in periods of higher 
uncertainty. Another central result of our paper is that it is mainly economic policy 
uncertainty that hampers capital flows to the emerging market and developing economies, 
since we have shown that the Baker-Bloom-Davis policy uncertainty index clearly beats the 
broader VIX index in terms of all statistical goodness-of-fit criteria. 
With an eye on our capital flow-type specific estimation results, it is apparent that 
policymakers in emerging market and developing economies ought to carefully analyse the 
composition of observed capital inflows and the factors that drive them. Indeed, for any 
serious assessment of financial vulnerabilities related to external financing it is crucial to 
understand the degree to which the drivers of capital flows are under or beyond the control 
of domestic economic policy (Koepke, 2015). Examples of factors that are beyond the 
control of domestic economic policies include, according to our empirical results, the ease 
of financing in global financial markets (with credit being among the key indicators in major 
industrialised economies) as well as global policy uncertainty. 
Since in the previous literature cyclical and structural forces have typically been analysed 
separately rather than in an integrated empirical framework, there is a risk that the 
importance of structural forces for capital flows to emerging market and developing 
economies may be understated in periods like the present one, when interest rates are ultra-
low worldwide, global liquidity in the BIS definition (“credit ease”) has gone down and 
policy uncertainty is high (cf. Koepke, 2015). This is exactly the reason why we developed 
an integrated empirical approach that simultaneously embraces structural push factors and 
external pull factors, such as policy uncertainty and global liquidity. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Overview of variables 
Variables Sources 
Dependent variables  
DIRINVLIAB, PORTINVLIAB, OTHERINVLIAB, 
DIRINVASSET 
PORTINVASSET, OTHERINVASSET 
with 
DIRINV = FDI inflow 
PORTINV = portfolio capital inflow 
OTHER = other capital inflows, esp. loans 
LIAB = change in domestic resident liabilities to 
foreigners 
ASSET = change in domestic resident liabilities to 
foreigners 
Financial Flow Analytics Database compiled from the 
IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics, International 
Financial Statistics, and World Economic Outlook 
databases, World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database, Haver Analytics, China Economic 
and Industry (CEIC) Asia database, and CEIC China 
database 
Pull factors  
Real GDP growth (DGDP), interest rate 
(CENTRALBANKRATE), trade openness 
(TRADEOPEN), reserves (RESERVES), income 
per capita (INCOMECAPI) 
IMF WEO database, International Financial Statistics 
(IFS), national sources 
Exchange rate regime (EXR) 
(1 to 5, the higher, the more flexible) 
IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) and Coarse 
Classification 
Exchange Rate Regime Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff 
Classification 
Web: http://www.carmenreinhart.com/data/browse-by-
topic/topics/11/ 
Institutional quality (INSTQUAL) Rule of law measure from World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 
Capital account openness (CAPACCOPEN) Chinn and Ito (2006), updated version of the database  
Web: http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm 
Financial development (FD) Svirydzenka (2016) 
Push factors  
Global risk aversion (VIX) Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Market 
Volatility Index (VIX), Haver Analytics  
Economic policy uncertainty (EPU) Baker, Bloom and Davis’ (2015) economic policy 
uncertainty index: http://www.policyuncertainty.com/ 
US yield gap (USYIELDGAP) = Gap between long- 
and short-maturity bond yields in the United States 
(IMF, 2016) 10-year minus 3-year bond yields. 
Federal Reserve (FRED) 
US corporate spreads (USCORPSPREAD) 
=US BAA corporate bond spreads over treasury 
FRED 
Global liquidity 
a) BIS global liquidity indicator (GLIBIS) = cross-
border lending and local lending denominated in 
foreign currencies, all instruments and for all sectors 
(Q:TO1:5J:A:B:I:A:USD) 
b) Global liquidity OECD (GLIOECD) = Broad 
money for all OECD countries 
Bank for International Settlements Global Liquidity 
Indicators (BIS, 2017): 
https://www.bis.org/statistics/gli.htm 
 
OECD 
US shadow rate 
(SHADOWFEDERALFUNDSRATE) 
Wu-Xia Shadow Federal Funds Rate from Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta, downloaded from Haver 
Analytics, Wu and Xia (2016) 
Commodity prices world (COMMODITYPRICE) International Monetary Fund 
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Appendix 2: Variable plots – foreign direct investment – gross outflows (change in foreign assets  
  owned by domestic residents) 
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Appendix 3: Variable plots – foreign direct investment – gross inflows (change in domestic resident 
  liabilities to foreigners) 
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Appendix 4: Variable plots – foreign portfolio investment – gross outflows (change in foreign assets 
  owned by domestic residents) 
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Appendix 6: Variable plots – other investment – gross outflows (change in foreign assets owned by 
  domestic residents) 
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Appendix 7: Variable plots – other investment – gross inflows (change in domestic resident  
  liabilities to foreigners) 
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Appendix 8: Variable plots – GDP (in Dollar) 
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Appendix 9: Variable plots – real GDP growth rates 
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Appendix 10: Variable plots – capital account openness 
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Appendix 11: Variable plots – commodity price 
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Appendix 12: Variable plots – global economic policy uncertainty 
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Appendix 13: Variable plots – income per capita 
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Appendix 14: Variable plots – institutional quality 
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Appendix 15: Variable plots – policy rates 
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Appendix 16: Variable plots – global liquidity 
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Appendix 17: Variable plots – reserves 
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Appendix 18: Variable plots – trade openness 
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Appendix 19: Variable plots – US yield gap 
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Appendix 20: Variable plots – VIX 
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Appendix 21: Variable plots – US shadow rate 
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Appendix 22: Variable plots – financial development 
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Appendix 23: Variable plots – exchange rate regime 
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Appendix 24: Variable plots – US corporate spread 
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